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A New Pricing Theory that Solves the St. Petersburg
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Abstract
The St. Petersburg Paradox, an important topic in probability theory,
has not been solved last 280 years. Since Nicolaus Bernoulli proposed
the St. Petersburg Paradox in 1738, many people had tried to solve it
and had proposed various explanations, but all are not satisfactory.
In the paper we proposed a new pricing theory with several rules,
which incidentally resolves this paradox. The new pricing theory states
that so-called fair (reasonable) pricing should be judged by the seller
and the buyer independently. Reasonable pricing for the seller may not
be appropriate for the buyer. The seller cares about costs, while the
buyer is concerned about the realistic prospect of returns.The pricing
theory we proposed can be applied to financial market to solve the
confusion that financial asset return with fat tails distribution will cause
the option pricing formula to fail, thus making up the theoretical defects
of quantitative financial pricing theory.
We want to pay tribute to Edward O. Thorp with this article, a man
for all markets, for the author entered the financial field just because
getting read his story.
* Dahang Li is a general partner of Element Alpha Fund.
2I. INTRODUCTION
The St. Petersburg Paradox is still an open problem today. The infinite expectation of the
St. Petersburg Paradox has been a source of contention within probability theory since its
inception in early 18th century [1].
The St. Petersburg Game is that: Peter tosses a fair coin repeatedly until it shows head,
he should pay 2N ducats to Paul if first head appeared on the N-th toss. How much should
Peter charge Paul as an entrance fee to make the game fair.
To determine the amount of the entrance fee, we calculate Pauls expected income. Let k be
any positive integer, then the probability that the game ends at the k-th toss is p(xk) = 2
−k,
at which time Peter will pay Paul xk = 2
k ducats. Let E denotes the expectation of Peters
payout. Therefore
E =
∞∑
k=1
xkp(xk) =
∞∑
k=1
2k2−k =
∞∑
k=1
1 =∞ (1)
proves that no finite amount of money can be a fair entrance fee. In short, Paul should be
willing to pay an infinite price to enter this game. However, almost no rational person would
agree to do that. People will only pay what they think is a moderate fee, and the fee is very
limited. In fact, it is generally no more than 20 ducats.
That is the St. Petersburg Paradox.
II. THE ST. PETERSBURG GAME CAN’T BE PRICED AS A LIMITED VALUE
Several approaches have been proposed for solving the paradox, such as Expected utility
theory, Probability weighting, Rejection of mathematical expectation, Finite St. Petersburg
lotteries. These views are very insightful, but none of them resolves the paradox perfectly.
Moreover, these approaches are non-quantitative descriptions that cannot be applied to the
actual decision-making directly.
It is generally believed that William Feller offered a mathematically correct solution
involving sampling [2]. It can be understood intuitively to “perform this game with a large
number of people and calculate the expected value from the sample extraction”. In this
method, when the games of infinite number of times are possible, the expectation would
be infinity, and in the case of finite, the expectation will be a much smaller value. Strictly
3speaking, when the games are played N times, the fair price should be log2N . William
Feller did a good job in quantifying the fair price of the St. Petersburg Game.
We have a different conclusion from other perspectives though. First, take a counter-
example to prove its irrationality: according to the statement, if Peter (banker) lets Paul
(player) play 1024 games, it’s fair for Peter to charge log2(1024) = 10 ducats each time,
and it’s also fair for Paul to pay 10 ducats each time. The problem is, if Paul plays 1024
games at the banker Peter, and then he goes to banker Tom to play another 1024 games. Paul
should be able to make a lot of money in this way, because the game is worth 11 ducats
each time for playing 2048 times. But neither Peter nor Tom will lose. How does this work?
Therefore, it is inappropriate that the so-called fair pricing is related to the number of times
player plays.
Next, We will strictly prove that the reasonable quotation of the St Petersburg Game’s
banker should indeed be infinite (that is, the banker cant quote). Let 1 and 0 denote head and
tail for the coin toss respectively. Each play of the St Petersburg Game can be represented
by an infinite binary sequence, which each bit is independent, identical distribution random
variable and selected from {0, 1} with equal probability. If the leftmost 1 appears at the N-th
bit (i.e. the first head appears on the N-th toss), Paul can get 2N ducats. The result of the
game is decided by the first N bits only.
Now, define a very simple Lottery Game K, where K is a positive integer . The lottery
number is a binary sequence with infinite digits, and each digit is independent, identical
distribution random variable and selected from {0, 1} with equal probability. The player
wins 2K ducats if the first K bits of the lottery number is
K−1︷ ︸︸ ︷
0 · · · 0 1, and nothing otherwise.
For E(x) = 1/2K × 2K = 1, the fair price of this lottery game is 1 ducat.
We take the same binary sequence as the process of the St. Petersburg Game, and as the
lottery number for Lottery Game 1, Lottery Game 2, Lottery Game 3, and so on as well.
Every lottery game that player plays is worth 1 ducat. Therefore, you cannot play this series
of unlimited lottery games at any limited price. In addition, it is important that for the same
binary sequence, the income for a single St. Petersburg Game play is equal to the total income
for playing the whole lottery game set.
Therefore, you can’t play the St. Petersburg Game with a limited price. QED.
4III. THE NEW PRICING THEORY
The St. Petersburg Paradox seems to be back to its original point. Now let’s put the
St. Petersburg Paradox aside and think about whether we can improve the pricing theory
generally.
For a discrete event, the buyer’s return is a discrete random variable X = [x1, x2, x3, · · · ],
the probability mass function p(x) = P (X = x), x ∈ X . The expectationE(X) =
∑
∞
i=1 xip(xi).
According to the conventional pricing theory, it will be considered fair for the seller to price
the event as µ = E(X) . For the continuous random variable X = f(x), it is similar. The
current pricing theory will suffer from the inability to explain the St. Petersburg Paradox,
and the inability to price options with certain fat tail distribution.
We propose a new pricing theory and several pricing rules to solve the issues above.
The gist of our new pricing theory is that a fair offer to the seller is not necessarily
an offer that the buyer is willing to accept. Buyers and sellers have their own decision-
making mechanisms. The seller is concerned about costs, and the buyer is concerned
about the realistic prospect of returns.
Rule 1: For the quotation µ offered by the seller, the buyer shall judge whether the
quotation is acceptable according to the following process.
At first, we define two parameters:
1) Hopeless Probability ǫ ∈ [0, 1] : let ǫ denote the probability that the buyer will ignore.
More formally, the buyer ignores the possibility that the probability of some opportunities
is not greater than ǫ, and does not pay for such opportunities.
2) Cost-effectiveness Factor k : let k denote the buyers investment preference. k=1 means
that the buyer seeks fair deals, and k < 1 means that the buyer seeks stable profit
opportunities (e.g. the wrong pricing of the seller), and k > 1 means that the buyer is
speculating (e.g. gaming).
Note that every buyer can choose his own ǫ and k values. Suppose that Nǫ is the minimum
positive integer such that
∞∑
i=Nǫ+1
p(xi) ≤ ǫ (2)
5Since
Nǫ∑
i=1
p(xi) +
∞∑
i=Nǫ+1
p(xi) =
∞∑
i=1
p(xi) = 1 (3)
we have
Nǫ∑
i=1
p(xi) = 1−
∞∑
i=Nǫ+1
p(xi) ≥ 1− ǫ (4)
and let
Eǫ =
Nǫ∑
i=1
xip(xi) (5)
then µ is an acceptable price for the buyer if µ ≤ kEǫ.
Rule 2: In the case that the contract must be executed at the end, the seller determines
the quotation µ with the expectation just like traditional pricing theory. That is
µ ≥ E(X) =
∞∑
i=1
xip(xi) (6)
Rule 3: In the case that the seller can close the contract during the process (such as stock
option), the seller uses a similar method as the buyer in Rule 1 to determining the quotation
µ. Thus, we have
ǫ ∈ [0, 1]
(2)
−→ Nǫ
(5)
−→ Eǫ (7)
and let µ = kEǫ, k ≥ 1 for gaining profit. When ǫ = 0 and k = 1, we have µ = E, this is
the conventional fair price. When ǫ > 0, the seller should choose k > 1, since he bears the
additional risk of ǫ without calculating the cost for gambling. The premise that sellers can
use Rule 3 is that the exchange has a margin system for risk control.
IV. RESOLVE THE ST. PETERSBURG PARADOX
Based on the pricing rules proposed in section III, the seller’s pricing should be infinite
for the St. Petersburg Game. That is, the seller cannot provide appropriate price for the game
to the buyer. This conclusion has been proved in section II, but it does not eliminate most
people’s doubts.
Camerer [3], Hayden [1] and many authors have discussed how much the St. Petersburg
Game is worth paying for. Usually, the values are small, and almost do not exceed 20 ducats.
The Rule 1 can explain this phenomenon well.
6Let’s first look at the American Powerball as a comparison, with a bet of two dollars,
and the odds of winning the jackpot is one in 292.2 million. In 2019, the Jackpot Amount
averaged about 171 million. Many people are willing to bet.
Back to the St. Petersburg Game, for 2−28 = 1
268435456
≈ 1
292200000
, let ǫ = 1
228
, we have
1
228
= ǫ ≥
∞∑
i=Nǫ+1
p(xi) =
∞∑
i=Nǫ+1
2−i = 2−Nǫ (8)
Hence, Nǫ = 28, we will omit those bonuses of 2
29,230,231,· · ·
Eǫ =
Nǫ∑
i=1
xip(xi) = 28 (9)
In other words, it is appropriate for a rational player to spend 28 ducats to play the St.
Petersburg Game. However, almost no one is willing to spend 28 ducats to play the St.
Petersburg Game. Why?
p(XNǫ) = 2
−28 =
1
268435456
>
1
292200000
XNǫ = 2
28 = 268435456 > 1.71× 108
(10)
An important difference between the Powerball lottery and the St. Petersburg Game is
that the St. Petersburg Game costs a lot more with close odds and amount of the jackpot.
Powerball lottery only costs 2 (dollars), while St. Petersburg Game costs 28 (ducats).
In this regard, the St. Petersburg Game is poorly designed, with a large bet amount,
everyone wins, and has not concentrated the cost on the players’ attention. This makes people
set the Cost-effectiveness Factor k to a very low value while playing the St. Petersburg Game,
such as k = 0.5; on the contrary, they will accept a much more large k even if k > 1 while
buying the Powerball lottery.
Sellers price based on cost, but buyers are not necessarily willing to pay for all costs. That
is the key to the St. Petersburg Paradox.
V. FAT TAIL AND OPTION PRICING
The correct description of asset return distribution is directly related to the correctness
of portfolio selection, the effectiveness of risk management and the rationality of option
pricing. In the classical efficient market hypothesis, stock returns are usually assumed to
follow a normal distribution in which the ends of the distribution are thin tails. However, in
7reality, markets do not behave in this way, and financial asset returns do not simply follow
geometric Brownian motion. The extreme events similar to the financial crisis occur much
more frequently than expected, and the empirical distribution of returns has obvious fat tails.
Mandelbrot [4], Fama [5], and Kon [6] all report evidence that stock returns are not consistent
with the random walk theory.
There are two wonderful passages in Taleb’s book [7]:”There is an example academic
literature trying to maintain us that options are not rational to own because some options
are overpriced, and they are embedded overpriced according to business school methods of
computing risks that do not take into account the possibility of rare events” and ”Further,
casino bets and lottery tickets also have a known maximum upside in real life, the sky is
often the limit, and the difference between the two cases can be significant. Risk taking ain’t
gambling, and optionality ain’t lottery tickets”. Coincidentally, our paper considers lottery
and options together.
It is of great importance to accurately describe the statistical characteristics of the financial
asset return distributions, which is the premise of the correct option pricing. Finance engineers
often choose the Lvy Distribution to model price changes in markets. The fat tail or slow
fall off indicates that this distribution model is a good match for what happens after prices
change. The normal (Gaussian) distribution, in which α = 2, is a special case of a Lvy
distribution. One case of a non-Gaussian Lvy distribution is the Cauchy distribution in which
α = 1.
The Lvy Stable Distribution (1 ≤ α < 2) implies infinite variance. Having an infinite
variance does not prevent a distribution from becoming proper, but it does make it quite
peculiar. In standard financial theory, volatility (σ) is the most important parameter and is
usually measured by the standard deviation of financial asset returns. Volatility is used in
the financial calculation of risk and option pricing. The variance of Lvy Stable Distribution
(σ2 = ∞) will make the option pricing formula yield a meaningless answer. Conventional
financial theories have been challenged for their lack of capability of realistically explaining
those meaningless results.
For example, for Cauchy distribution, its density function is
p(x) =
1
π(x2 + 1)
(11)
8Calculating the European call option price C in which S(T ) is the price of the stock at
time T , K is the exercise price, and the risk-free rate of return is r, the following equation
is applicable:
C = e−rTE[max(S(T )−K, 0)]
= e−rT
∫
∞
K
(x−K)p(x)dx = e−rT
∫
∞
K
(x−K)
1
π(x2 + 1)
dx
= e−rT
(∫
∞
K
x
π(x2 + 1)
dx−K
∫
∞
K
1
π(x2 + 1)
dx
)
> e−rT
(∫
∞
K
x
π(x2 + 1)
dx−K
)
≥ e−rT
(∫
∞
max(K,2)
x
π(x2 + 1)
dx−K
)
≥ e−rT
(∫
∞
max(K,2)
x
π(x2 + x)
dx−K
)
= e−rT
(∫
∞
max(K,2)
1
π(x+ 1)
dx−K
)
= e−rT
(
ln(x+ 1)
π
|∞max(K,2) −K
)
=∞
(12)
This equation presents a problem.
Now, in terms of option pricing, according to the new pricing theory (rules) proposed in
section III, E[max(S(T )−K, 0)] and E[max(K − S(T ), 0)] no longer have to be finite.
When calculating the option price, a sufficiently small ǫ[0, 1] should be selected as the
hopeless probability, and we assume that U satisfies the equation:∫
∞
U
p(x)dX ≤ ǫ (13)
then
C = e−rT
∫ U
−∞
max(x−K, 0)p(x)dx = e−rT
∫ U
K
(x−K)p(x)dx (14)
Considering the actual situation of the real securities market, we can consider that ST <
100S is absolutely true, that is, U = 100S fulfills (13).
Thus
C = e−rT
∫ 100S
K
(x−K)p(x)dx (15)
Similarly, we have
P = e−rT
∫ K
0.01S
(K − x)p(x)dx (16)
Finally, we can conclude that there is no need to worry about the probability density
distribution causing the option pricing formula to fail. The upper and lower limits of the
integration operation can be truncated.
9VI. CONCLUSIONS
In this paper, we proposed a new pricing theory. An offer that is fair to the seller is not
necessarily an offer that the buyer is willing to accept. The buyer and the seller have their own
decision-making mechanisms. The seller is concerned about costs, and the buyer is concerned
about the realistic prospect of returns. We also proposed three specific quantitative pricing
rules. Moreover, our paper solves the St. Petersburg Paradox perfectly and gives a method
for pricing options of financial assets with fat tail distribution.
For the next step, there will be good prospects for studying the distribution model (with
fat tails) of actual stock/index and the method of determining the Hopeless Probability ǫ.
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